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Although forgetting the details of events from one’s personal 
past is generally viewed as a negative outcome, it may serve an 
adaptive function, especially when the environment contains 
inescapable reminders of negative events. M. C. Anderson 
and Huddleston (2012) proposed that repeatedly suppressing 
thoughts of an autobiographical experience eventually leads to 
its persistent forgetting and that individuals might purposefully 
suppress thoughts of negative autobiographical experiences to 
promote emotional stability and resilience in response to fre-
quent reminders. Although their review reveals plentiful evi-
dence for the effectiveness of suppression-induced forgetting 
(SIF) of laboratory materials, associated effects on autobio-
graphical memory and the concomitant emotional impact 
seemed to have gone undiscovered. We therefore developed a 
method to initiate their investigation and applied it to memo-
ries generated by dysphoric and nondysphoric students in 
response to emotional and nonemotional cues.
To vary retrieval suppression, we used the think/no-think 
(TNT) suppression paradigm developed by M. C. Anderson 
and Green (2001). In the typical TNT task, participants first 
study neutral, weakly related cue–target word pairs. In the 
next phase, some studied cues repeatedly signal the practice of 
target recall, others signal avoidance of all thoughts of the tar-
gets, and the remaining, nonpresented cues are reserved to 
function as baseline items on the final test, in which recall of 
all targets is requested. Reduced recall of suppressed targets, 
compared to baseline targets, constitutes evidence for SIF. Ini-
tially, research using the TNT paradigm was designed in ways 
that were difficult to generalize to everyday experience, but 
not for long. Variations of the basic paradigm have revealed 
SIF when verbal cues and targets are related (e.g., Hertel, 
Large, Stück, & Levy, 2012; Hertel & McDaniel, 2010). 
SIF also occurs with pictorial and emotional stimuli (e.g., 
Depue, Banich, & Curran, 2006; Hertel & McDaniel, 2010; 
Joormann, Hertel, Brozovich, & Gotlib, 2005; Joormann, 
Hertel, LeMoult, & Gotlib, 2009), when the need to suppress 
can be anticipated (Hanslmayr, Leipold, & Bauml, 2010), and 
when the test itself is an indirect measure of forgetting (Hertel 
et al., 2012). Yet, until recently, all evidence of SIF had 
involved experimentally supplied events.1 The current study 
was the first, to our knowledge, to extend the TNT paradigm to 
autobiographical memories and thus to examine the effects of 
repeated suppression on memory for multimodal, personally 
relevant material.
In our adaptation of the TNT procedure, participants first 
generated autobiographical memories and titles to neutral and 
emotionally positive or negative cues. During the TNT phase, 
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they practiced responding to some of the cues with their asso-
ciated titles and suppressing thoughts about the titles and 
memories related to other cues. Then, after a brief distracting 
task, participants attempted to recall titles and memories asso-
ciated with all cues—cues for response practice, cues for sup-
pression, and baseline cues. We examined SIF in the traditional 
sense by scoring accuracy of the memory’s gist, but because it 
seemed unlikely that participants would forget the gist of 
recently recalled, personally meaningful events, we focused 
instead on a measure of memory impairment that is common 
in studies of autobiographical memory.
Overgeneral memory is a phenomenon characterized by the 
restriction of autobiographical recall to a general level, per-
haps due to the avoidance of details that might evoke emotion 
(Williams et al., 2007). It is typically assessed by administer-
ing the Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT; Williams & 
Broadbent, 1986), a set of one-word cues and the instruction to 
produce specific memories—events that occurred within a 
time frame of 1 day. Recalled memories that fail to comply 
with these instructions are denoted as categorical (events that 
occurred several times) or extended (events occurring over an 
extended period of time), although the difference between 
these failures was not important for our purpose of investigat-
ing loss of specificity following suppression practice. Cate-
gorical memories are typically schematic in nature (e.g., “my 
mother used to make my lunch”); extended memories also 
tend to omit details (e.g., “my father worked while we were in 
Florida on vacation”). Both types of generality suited our pur-
pose, and therefore, they were not distinguished.
Previous studies have examined overgeneral memory as a 
consequence of thought suppression, although not in the con-
text of the TNT paradigm, and have shown that suppressing 
thoughts of a single event leads to subsequent overgeneral 
recall for other, unrelated memories (Dalgleish & Yiend, 2006; 
Schönfeld, Ehlers, Böllinghaus, & Rief, 2007). To our knowl-
edge, studies of direct suppression and autobiographical mem-
ory have not examined the effect of suppressing particular 
memories on their subsequent recall. Consistent with the typi-
cal TNT approach, we predicted reduced specificity of sup-
pressed memories relative to baseline, unpracticed memories.
Two additional features of the experiment are important. 
First, it remains unclear whether emotionally negative, posi-
tive, and neutral materials are equally vulnerable to the effects 
of suppression practice. Some studies have found greater rates 
of below-baseline forgetting for emotionally negative material 
(e.g., Joormann et al., 2005; Lambert, Good, & Kirk, 2010), 
whereas others have found no differences (e.g., Hertel & 
Gerstle, 2003). Thus, we decided to explore the role of valence 
by having each participant generate autobiographical memo-
ries to both neutral and emotionally positive or negative cues. 
Second, to examine state-related differences, we recruited 
both dysphoric and nondysphoric individuals. Dysphoric and 
depressed individuals more often exhibit reduced memory 
specificity (Williams et al., 2007), and they may be more moti-
vated to suppress thoughts of their personal pasts—thoughts 
about emotionally negative events in particular. On the other 
hand, because of impaired cognitive control in suppressing 
thoughts during TNT (Hertel & Gerstle, 2003), dysphoric par-
ticipants might not show changes in specificity as a function of 
suppression practice. In summary, we predicted suppression-
induced reductions in the specificity of autobiographical 
memories—reductions that might be qualified by the emo-
tional characteristics of the cues and the negative affect of the 
participants. The outcome should inform our inclinations to 
recommend thought suppression as a method of preventing or 
interrupting ruminative tendencies and improving resilience 
when there are no longer benefits to be achieved by remem-
bering memorial details.
Method
Participants and design
Sixty-seven female students were recruited on the basis of 
their scores on a modified version of the Beck Depression 
Inventory (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996), completed 
during screening. Students who scored 13 or higher were 
recruited to participate as dysphoric (see Dozois, Dobson, & 
Ahnberg, 1998) and those who scored 5 or lower were recruited 
to participate as nondysphoric. A second BDI-II was adminis-
tered at the end of the experimental session, and data from 7 
students were set aside because their final scores were less 
than 10 in the dysphoric group or greater than 8 in the nondys-
phoric group.2 (Descriptive statistics are listed in Table 1.)
All participants received both neutral and emotional cues. 
With the constraint of equal n, participants were randomly 
assigned to receive either positive or negative emotional cues 
and to one of three counterbalancing conditions for rotating 
materials across the TNT instructional conditions of respond-
ing, suppressing, or baseline.
Materials and procedure
Trait descriptors were chosen as AMT cues (N. Anderson, 
1968) on the basis of likeability ratings less than 200 (negative 
cues; e.g., offensive, jealous), from 250 to 350 (neutral; e.g., 
innocent, bashful), and greater than 450 (positive; e.g., gener-
ous, humorous). Within each valence, cues were distributed 
into three sets of five, and sets were balanced for likeability, 
frequency, and word length. One additional cue representing 
each valence served as practice.
At the start, participants completed a visual analogue scale 
(VAS) to record the extent to which they felt pessimistic or 
optimistic, happy or sad, and distressed or calm (each scale 
ranging from 0 to 100). In the memory-generation phase, 
participants responded to each computer-displayed cue by 
retrieving a specific autobiographical memory, defined as an 
event in their personal past that occurred within 1 day. Cues 
were ordered in five randomized blocks (three emotional and 
three neutral cues per block, each representing one of the three 
instructional conditions during the next phase). Participants 
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were given as much time as necessary to complete memory-
generation trials, and each trial component was self-paced. A 
key press indicated memory retrieval and initiated the ques-
tion “Is the memory specific?” together with the definition of 
specificity. After typing yes or no, participants clicked next 
and were prompted on a new screen to type a short description 
of the memory. Following their description, they again clicked 
next and proceeded to a screen requesting that they rate the 
vividness of the memory on a 5-point scale. After clicking next 
a final time, they typed a one-word title for the memory to help 
them recall it later; they stated the cue and the title aloud 
for recording by the experimenter, who was otherwise blind 
to memory production. The experimenter asked for correc-
tions to duplicate titles and titles that matched experimental 
cues (both rare occurrences). Titles typically referred to the 
people or events uniquely described in each memory (e.g., 
“prom” in response to “extravagant” and “jobs” in response to 
“dependent”). Following two practice trials and 30 memory-
generation trials, participants completed a second VAS.
In the TNT phase, the experimenter explained that perfor-
mance in avoiding thoughts of targets would be analyzed in 
relation to general cognitive ability. Cues included 10 emo-
tional and 10 neutral cues from the generation phase, with the 
remaining 5 of each type reserved as baseline. Following TNT 
practice with the previous practice cues, these 20 cues each 
appeared for 4 s on 12 occasions, each time preserving the 
block order from the generation phase. Ten cues (5 emotional 
and 5 neutral) were presented in green, and participants were 
instructed to respond to them aloud with titles and to think 
about the corresponding memories. Incorrect or omitted titles 
were corrected by the experimenter. Ten cues were presented 
in red. We instructed participants to attend to red cues for their 
duration but to prevent the corresponding titles and memories 
from coming to mind, even after cue offset. Errors were fol-
lowed by a display of large red Xs.
Following TNT, participants completed a third VAS, and 
then, as a purported measure of their cognitive ability, they 
attempted Set E of Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices 
(Raven, 1960) for 10 min before the final recall test began. 
Cue order on the test preserved the same block order used dur-
ing generation. To each cue, participants first signaled recall 
with a key press and then typed the memory’s title and short 
description. Failure to signal within 6 s automatically pro-
duced the title and description requests (which could be com-
pleted with “?” if forgotten); typing of titles and descriptions 
was self-paced. Reminders to produce specific memories were 
not repeated, but the experimenter stressed the importance of 
reporting the same titles and memories exactly as produced 
during generation.
Results
Memory specificity
Two judges, blind to conditions, independently determined the 
status (overgeneral or specific) of each initially generated 
memory and (separately) each reproduced memory on the 
Table 1. Mean Responses (Standard Deviations)
Nondysphoric Dysphoric
Measure
Neutral and  
positive cues
Neutral and  
negative cues
Neutral and  
positive cues
Neutral and  
negative cues
BDI-II 3.5 (2.1) 3.6 (2.6) 17.3 (6.5) 17.9 (7.0)
Proportion specific
 Generation .96 (.046) .94 (.078) .96 (.034) .96 (.056)
 Final recall .89 (.086) .89 (.089) .90 (.059) .84 (.144)
 Reduction .07 .06 .06 .12
Valence ratings
 Generation 5.09 (.30) 5.95 (.29) 5.04 (.33) 6.22 (.25)
 Final recall 5.19 (.28) 5.87 (.16) 5.01 (.35) 5.97 (.19)
 Average 5.14 5.91 5.02 6.09
 Change -.10 .08 .03 .25
VAS for calm
 Before generation 65 (20.9) 77 (12.9) 51 (20.1) 48 (22.4)
 After generation 74 (16.7) 76 (15.9) 50 (24.7) 61 (22.2)
 After TNT 73 (15.8) 78 (16.9) 51 (23.1) 65 (18.6)
Note: BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory revised; TNT = think/no-think; VAS = Visual Analog Scale. n = 
15, except in the case of VAS scores in the first three columns, where n = 14. Possible valence ratings ranged 
from 1 = very positive to 9 = very negative. The VAS ranged from 0 to 100; high scores indicate calm; low scores 
indicate distress.
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final test. (Memories were judged as specific if they clearly 
denoted an event that occurred within 1 day.) The judgments 
were identical on 97% of memories, and the few disagree-
ments were resolved by a third judge. The proportion of spe-
cific memories (out of the total number produced) was 
submitted to a mixed-design analysis of variance, with TNT 
instruction (respond, baseline, or suppress), cue emotionality 
(neutral or emotional), and phase (generation or final recall) as 
within-subjects factors and valence of the emotional cues 
(positive or negative) and group (dysphoric or nondysphoric) 
as between-subjects factors. The significance level was set at 
.05. Significant main effects qualified by significant interac-
tions are not reported.
The first important outcome was the predicted interaction 
of phase and instruction, F(2, 112) = 5.38, mean squared error 
(MSE) = .011, p = .006, ηp
2 = .09. Relevant means are illus-
trated in Figure 1. Tests of simple main effects found nonsig-
nificant differences in the generation phase between the 
proportion of specific memories to be responded (M = .95, 
SD = .07), reserved as baseline (M = .96, SD = .07), or sup-
pressed (M = .96, SD = .09) (F < 1.0) but a significant differ-
ence among responded (M = .90, SD = .12), baseline (M = .90, 
SD = .13), and suppressed memories (M = .84, SD = .15) in 
final recall, F(2, 112) = 5.58, MSE = .022 p = .005, ηp
2 = .06. 
A planned comparison revealed that the specificity of sup-
pressed memories was reduced relative to baseline memories, 
F(1, 56) = 5.57, MSE = .026, p = .022, ηp
2 = .05.
The phase-by-instruction interaction was not significantly 
qualified by other effects in the overall design (p > .12). Nev-
ertheless, it would be misleading if we failed to call attention 
to the pattern of means for baseline and suppress cues shown 
in Table 2. The below-baseline specificity reduction was −.03 
for positive cues (and .08 for neutral cues received by the same 
participants), whereas it was as large as .12 in the negative 
condition.
As the only significant higher order interaction in the 
design, the three-way interaction among phase, valence, and 
group did not involve instruction during the TNT phase but is 
nonetheless notable, F(1, 56) = 4.69, MSE = .017, p = .035, 
ηp
2 = .08. The Phase × Valence interaction (not found for non-
dysphoric participants, p = .457) was significant for dysphoric 
participants, F(1, 28) = 4.78, MSE = .020, p = .037, ηp
2 = .15. 
As shown in Table 1, the reduction in the specificity of dys-
phoric students’ responses to all cues was greater if half of 
their cues had been negative (compared to half positive), 
regardless of the role played by the cues during TNT.
Finally, the two remaining significant interactions did not 
involve the experimental phase. First, the effect of instruction 
depended on the valence of the emotional cues, F(2, 112) = 
3.47, MSE = .018, p = .034, ηp
2 = .06. The comparison of 
baseline and suppressed memories was significant when the 
emotional cues were negative, F(1, 28) = 4.99, MSE = .025, 
p = .034, ηp
2 = .15, but not when they were positive (F < 
1.0). Second, the difference in response specificity to neutral 
versus emotional cues depended on the valence of the latter, 
F(1, 56) = 5.09, MSE = .016, p = .028, ηp
2 = .08. Participants 
responded to neutral cues with uniformly high levels of speci-
ficity (M = .93 in each valence group) but differentially to 
emotional cues (positive group: M = .93; negative group: M = 
.89). Supplemental materials include means and standard 
deviations according to each factor in the full design.
Memory accuracy
A memory was deemed accurate if it reported the same event 
as initially recalled. The omission or addition of event details 
was not taken into account when determining accuracy, unless 
the details provided in the final test directly contradicted those 
provided initially. The analysis of variance in the proportion 
of accurate memories yielded two significant effects. The first 
was a main effect of instruction, F(2, 112) = 31.79, MSE = 
.025, p < .001, ηp
2 = .36. Responded memories were recalled 
more accurately (M = .97, SD = .09) than both suppressed 
(M = .84, SD = .19) and baseline memories (M = .82, SD = 
.19). The second significant outcome was an interaction 
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Figure 1. Mean proportion of specific responded, baseline, and suppressed 
memories produced in the generation phase and then in final recall. TNT = 
think/no-think
Table 2. Mean Proportion of Specific Memories During Final 
Recall
Positive condition Negative condition
Instruction
Positive  
cue
Neutral  
cue
Negative 
cue
Neutral  
cue
Generation
 Responded .94 (.089) .94 (.107) .97 (.076) .95 (.086)
 Suppressed .98 (.061) .95 (.104) .97 (.092) .93 (.141)
 Baseline .95 (.086) .99 (.037) .96 (.081) .94 (.130)
Final recall
 Responded .88 (.154) .90 (.149) .91 (.120) .90 (.154)
 Suppressed .91 (.118) .85 (.158) .82 (.210) .78 (.237)
 Baseline .88 (.180) .93 (.137) .94 (.145) .84 (.209)
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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between emotion and valence, F(1, 56) = 5.27, MSE = .022, 
p = .025, ηp
2 = .09. Participants in the negative valence condi-
tion recalled memories associated with negative cues less 
accurately (M = .81, SD = .18) than those associated with neu-
tral cues (M = .88, SD = .14), whereas those in the positive 
valence condition recalled memories associated with positive 
(M = .90, SD = .13) and neutral (M = .90, SD = .13) cues with 
equal accuracy.3
Memory valence
To examine whether the memories themselves varied emo-
tionally in ways consistent with the cues, we asked two indi-
viduals, blind to conditions, to rate the memories in each phase 
from 1 (extremely positive) to 9 (extremely negative). Analysis 
of their averaged ratings revealed four significant interactions. 
Across both phases, the negative condition produced more 
negative memories in response to emotional cues (M = 6.29 
vs. 4.61 in the positive condition) but similarly rated memories 
in response to neutral cues (M = 5.71 vs. 5.56), F(1, 56) = 
128.59, MSE = .817, p < .001, ηp
2 = .70.
Means relevant to the remaining three significant interac-
tions are shown in Table 1. The interaction of valence with 
phase, F(1, 56) = 15.00, MSE = .130, p < .001, ηp
2 = .21, indi-
cated that the ratings did not change in the positive condition 
but became less negative in the negative condition. The inter-
action of group with phase was also significant, F(1, 56) = 
7.48, MSE = .130, p = .008, ηp
2 = .12; only the memories pro-
duced by dysphoric participants decreased in negativity on the 
final test. Last, the interaction of group with the valence of the 
emotional cues was significant, F(1, 56) = 5.12, MSE = .782, 
p = .028, ηp
2 = .08; the difference between memories produced 
by participants who received negative cues and those who 
received positive cues was larger in the dysphoric group than 
in the nondysphoric group. Supplemental materials contain a 
table of all means and standard deviations.
Emotional consequences of TNT
Of the three VAS scales, only distressed/calm revealed changes 
across the three administrations. The three-way interaction of 
phase, valence, and group was significant, F(2, 106) = 4.00, 
MSE = 168.57, p = .021, ηp
2 = .07. Follow-up tests within each 
group revealed only a nonsignificant trend (p = .085) for the 
dysphoric participants to be less distressed after generating 
memories to negative cues (see Table 1).
Discussion
Consistent with traditional TNT findings (see M. C. Anderson 
& Huddleston, 2012), we found evidence for impaired recall 
of suppressed memories relative to baseline memories. Sup-
pressed memories became less specific following TNT sup-
pression. In addition, reduced specificity, regardless of TNT 
instructions, characterized the final recall of dysphoric 
students who had received negative cues, and their memories 
became less negative than they were at the outset.
As anticipated, our adaptation of the TNT paradigm did not 
yield below-baseline forgetting in the traditional sense. Unlike 
the materials used in more standard TNT paradigms, the tar-
gets submitted to suppression practice in the present study 
were emotional, self-generated, personally relevant, and 
related to the associated cues. Given these critical differences, 
our failure to generalize the effect to autobiographical accu-
racy hardly seems surprising. However, the reductions in spec-
ificity observed in our study correspond to the typical 
below-baseline forgetting observed in the TNT task in that 
they involve a failure to recall autobiographical memory 
details (see Wessel & Hauer, 2006). For example, in response 
to the cue “illogical,” one participant initially retrieved, “My 
sister accused me of turning our parents against her because 
they didn’t want her to go to her favorite college” and, follow-
ing suppression practice, recalled, “My parents didn’t like my 
sister’s favorite college.” The initial response clearly denotes a 
single event, whereas the memory recalled during the final test 
omits autobiographical details. Another participant, in 
response to the cue “dependent,” initially reported, “I was 
unable to find a job one summer, making me feel bad for being 
so dependent on my parents one day when my friends were 
talking about their jobs and wages” and, following suppres-
sion, recalled, “I couldn’t find a summer job one year and felt 
bad for being so dependent on my parents financially.” The 
initially recalled event describes an emotion experienced on a 
single day, whereas the final memory contained a less detailed 
description of feelings that endured over an extended period of 
time.
Although the below-baseline reduction in specificity did 
not significantly interact with the valence of emotional cues, it 
appeared more obviously in the recall of participants who 
received negative cues, and their memories also became less 
negative on the final recall test. This pattern seems consistent 
with previous TNT studies reporting greater rates of below-
baseline forgetting for negative relative to positive targets 
(e.g., Joormann et al., 2005; Lambert et al., 2010). Memories 
associated with negative cues were also recalled less accu-
rately overall, supporting the idea that negative materials may 
be more vulnerable to forgetting.
Unlike other TNT experiments (Hertel & Gerstle, 2003; 
Joormann et al., 2009), we did not find evidence for depres-
sion-related impairments in either forgetting or specificity 
reduction. Instead, dysphoric students who had initially 
responded to negative emotional cues subsequently recalled 
less specifically, regardless of the emotionality of the test cue 
or its role in the TNT phase. This outcome suggests a possible 
dysphoric tendency to engage in avoidant coping (Williams et 
al., 2007). A similar pattern has been found in other experi-
ments on suppression-induced overgeneral memory, in which 
suppression of a particular memory reduced the specificity of 
unrelated memories on a subsequent test (Dalgleish & Yiend, 
2006; Schönfeld et al., 2007). In our case, at least, these very 
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general effects might simply be due to the absence of remind-
ers to be specific that had been provided in the previous gen-
eration phase—reminders potentially not needed by the 
nondysphoric students—if it were not for the fact that the dys-
phoric students receiving positive cues performed well.
The memories of dysphoric participants, independent of 
TNT instruction, and the suppressed memories of both partici-
pant groups exposed to negative cues became not only less 
specific in the final test but also less negative. The concurrent 
reductions in specificity and negativity are consistent with the 
functional avoidance hypothesis proposed by Williams et al. 
(2007), in which reduced specificity occurs as an avoidant 
coping strategy to limit the emotional disturbance associated 
with re-experiencing details from negative life events. Previ-
ous studies have also provided evidence for a relationship 
between memory specificity and affect. Recalling a high 
proportion of specific memories is associated with having a 
more negative perception of a frustrating event (e.g., Raes, 
Hermans, de Decker, Eelen, & Williams, 2003) and greater 
distress following negative life events (Hermans et al., 2008). 
Because memories produced by our negative group were more 
negative than memories in our positive group, students in the 
negative group might have been motivated to avoid the details 
of those memories and therefore to produce less specific and 
less negative recall on the final test. And for dysphoric stu-
dents in the negative group, such avoidance seemed to have 
generalized to all cues, regardless of previous suppression 
attempts.
As an early attempt to examine suppression-induced effects 
on autobiographical memories, our experiment reveals limita-
tions for future research to address. First, unlike more typical 
TNT paradigms, our adaptation of the TNT procedure did not 
include a test to ensure (prior to the TNT phase) equivalent 
“learning” of materials designated for responding, baseline, or 
suppressing; in our case, the concern is to establish rough 
equivalencies in linkages between memories and cues. Our 
exclusion of such a phase was prompted by time constraints 
and concerns about participant fatigue, because most sessions 
lasted approximately 2 hours and some lasted longer. Instead, 
we assumed that any differences would be random across 
instructional conditions. Second, our retention interval follow-
ing the TNT phase was short (because of the same concerns), 
but it is important to discover whether the effects of suppres-
sion-practice would increase or decrease with longer delays 
before the final test (see M. C. Anderson & Huddleston, 2012; 
Hotta & Kawaguchi, 2009). Third, we hope that future research 
will examine the conditions for achieving autobiographical 
forgetting beyond the reduction of specificity, and we suspect 
that they involve the practice of suppression across multiple 
occasions and contexts. Thus, forgetting of autobiographical 
events might be found on a continuum that ranges from the 
forgetting of details to the forgetting of gist. Finally, experi-
mental attention surely should be focused on the neural mech-
anisms underlying autobiographical memory suppression in 
comparison to the mechanisms of SIF involving laboratory 
materials (see M. C. Anderson et al., 2004).
In conclusion, we offer a few thoughts about the implica-
tions of our findings for managing memories in emotionally 
disordered populations. At the outset, we suggested that the 
ability to avoid recalling details of negative life experiences in 
the face of potential reminders may promote resilience through 
the interruption or prevention of ruminative episodes. This 
suggestion, derived as it is from the TNT method of suppress-
ing formerly recalled memories, clearly applies only to memo-
ries that have all too readily come to mind on previous 
occasions. As such, it stands in clear contrast to memorial 
experience in posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and the 
corresponding recommendations regarding clinical treatment 
(see Krans, Näring, Becker, & Holmes, 2009). In that litera-
ture, memory suppression is associated with the onset of mal-
adaptive reactions to trauma, whereas memory “expression” 
soon after the trauma reduces early involuntary, intrusive 
memories (flashbacks) even to the point of reducing or elimi-
nating PTSD symptoms. We therefore concur with an opinion 
expressed in a letter by Holmes, Moulds, and Kavanagh (2007) 
that results from TNT experiments should not be generalized 
to trauma-related memories. Nevertheless, we recommend 
experimental explorations concerning the clinical value in tar-
geted suppression of emotional but nontraumatic memories 
that live on in ruminative episodes, long past their therapeutic 
usefulness (e.g., a final conversation with a former partner, a 
poorly delivered conference talk, a stupid remark made to a 
colleague). In such cases, it appears that with repeated prac-
tice, the specificity and emotional potency of autobiographical 
experiences can be reduced, and the “unforgettable” can, at 
least in part, be forgotten.
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Notes
1. While this report was under review, we discovered that Noreen 
and MacLeod (2012) also found evidence of SIF of autobiographical 
memories.
2. We maintained data from students who scored slightly outside the 
initial boundaries out of concern that our task might have temporarily 
affected the scores at the end of the session. Under instructions from 
the Institutional Review Board, we removed the suicide item from 
the BDI-II; possible scores therefore ranged from 0 to 60. 
Nondysphoric participants were also chosen for their slightly repres-
sive tendencies, as evidenced by scores above the median (15) on the 
Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) and below the 
median (39) on the trait version of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
(Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983; see also 
Myers & Derakshan, 2004).
3. Latencies to retrieve memories showed the same pattern of effects 
as did the gist-accuracy data; longer latencies occurred in the same 
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conditions as lower accuracies. A table of means and standard devia-
tions is included in supplemental materials.
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